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Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia 
(Civil Action No. 84-03040) 
Theodore B. Olson, with whom Eldon Olson was on the 
brief, for appellant. Wayne A. Schrader also entered an 
appearance for appellant. 
James H. Heller, with whom Douglas B. Huron was on 
the brief, for appellee. 
Susan L.P. Starr was on the brief for amicus curiae 
urging that the District Court's decision be affirmed. 
Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. The 
court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out of time. 
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Before: MIKVA, EDWARDS and HENDERSON, Circuit 
Judges. 
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS. 
Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 
EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: This case, before this court 
for the second time, arises from a decision by appellant 
Price Waterhouse to deny partnership to one of its 
employees, appellee Ann B. Hopkins. We are again asked 
to review a finding by the District Court that Price Water-
house's denial of partnership to Ms. Hopkins violated 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C . 
§§ 2000e et seq. (1988), and to assess its shaping of an 
appropriate remedy. 
In Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), the 
Supreme Court clearly established that "partnership con-
sideration may qualify as a term, condition, or privilege 
of a person's employment" such that Title VII will provide 
a cause of action if partnership is denied because of sex 
discrimination. Id. at 78 n.10. Chief Justice Burger, writ-
ing for a unanimous Court in Hishon, held that 
even if . . . a partnership invitation is not itself an 
offer of employment, Title VII would nonetheless 
apply and preclude discrimination on the basis of sex. 
The benefit a plaintiff is denied need not be 
employment to fall within Title VII's protection; it 
need only be a term, condition, or privilege of 
employment .... Accordingly, nothing in the change 
in status that advancement to partnership might 
entail means that partnership consideration falls out-
side the terms of the statute. 
Id. at 77 (emphasis in original). 
It is undisputed that, for professional employees like 
Ms. Hopkins, Price Waterhouse held out the prospect of 
admission to partnership as a privilege of employment. 
Indeed, the District Court expressly found that 
"[p] artnership consideration was clearly a privilege of 
plaintiff's employment." See Hopkins v. Pr-ice Waterhouse, 
:--- · - \ ·•· -~ . . 
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618 F. Supp. 1109, 1119 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd in part and 
rev'd in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'd in part 
and rev'd and remanded in part, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). 
Moreover, decisions concerning admission to partnership 
were to be based exclusively on merit, taking into account 
a range of job-related considerations - "from practice 
development and technical expertise to interpersonal 
skills and participation in civic activities." Id. at 1112. The 
trial court found, however, that Ann Hopkins was denied 
partnership at Price Waterhouse in part because of sexual 
stereotyping, which is a form of sex discrimination under 
Title VII. See id. at 1119-20. We upheld that finding, see 
825 F.2d at 468, as did the Supreme Court, see 109 S. Ct. 
at 1791, 1793 (plurality opinion); id. at 1802, 1805 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
The Supreme Court, while agreeing that Price Water-
house had been motivated in part by discriminatory 
stereotyping, remanded the case for reconsideration of 
Price Waterhouse's claim that the decision to deny part-
nership to Ms. Hopkins would have remained the same 
even in the absence of the proscribed discrimination. Dur-
ing the first trial before the District Court, Price Water-
house was given an opportunity to show that it would 
have reached the same decision regarding Ms. Hopkins 
even absent any discrimination; however, both the trial 
court and this court required Price Waterhouse to make 
this showing by clear and convincing evidence. In revers-
ing on this point, the Supreme Court ruled that the Dis-
trict Court must determine whether, on the record before 
it, Price Waterhouse had shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that it would have denied partnership to Ms. 
Hopkins in any event for nondiscriminatory reasons. The 
Supreme Court thus remanded for reconsideration on this 
limited issue. 
On remand, the District Court first offered to permit 
Price Waterhouse to introduce new evidence concerning 
nondiscriminatory reasons justifying the denial of part-
nership to Ms. Hopkins; Price Waterhouse declined this 
offer, choosing instead to rely on the evidence already 
~ ....... ,,.,.-., 
;)\-:~~;(-. 
. ~ ~ 
'.~~fi,\:., 
i:f:. '~·::;-: :-~; . 
... ·. 
' . ·, --:..-·. 
:·- ;_· 
4 
introduced at the first trial. The trial court then reviewed that evidence and found that Price Waterhouse failed to carry the burden placed upon it by the Supreme Court. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202 (D.D.C. 1990). Having found appellant liable under Title VII, the District Court ordered Price Waterhouse to admit Ann Hopkins into the firm's partnership and to pay her $371,000 in back pay. On this appeal, Price Waterhouse challenges both the District Court's finding of liability and its remedial order that Ms. Hopkins be made a partner. We can find no merit in either of these challenges. 
Price Waterhouse's argument that Title VII does not authorize a court to order elevation to partnership rests ultimately upon the untenable suggestion that Hishon conferred only a cause of action for the discriminatory denial of partnership and never meant to imply a corre-sponding remedy. We find it inconceivable, however, that the Supreme Court intended to open up a partnership's admission decisions to judicial scrutiny while placing them beyond effective judicial remedy. On this point, it is important to note that this case involves only an employ-ee's elevation to partnership; it does not involve a party's retention of partnership or the regulation of the relation-ship among partners. Thus, we are not confronted by the concerns expressed in Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Hishon, in which he emphasized that the Court in Hishon did not reach the question whether Title VII would protect employees after they became partners, see 467 U.S. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring); we emphasize the same point today, for we have no occasion to decide this question. 
Finding no error in either the trial court's finding of lia-bility or in its shaping of an appropriate remedy, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Ann Hopkins joined Price Waterhouse in 1978, as a member of the professional staff in the firm's Office of 
~·~~/~;~·-• :~-:- ~~ -~-
- .. ·- .... -~,~ 
,. -,-~-=~,.:'.-· · :.....1:· 
-tti<};_.':-~ ·:..:: . 
.,. 
'.: ~ :•~.~4 ,t I ' ,• ~; • 
~1;;~~~;_:~f ~~?~. _ ~" 
. i~t:f ·-:i", ; : 
' .~ ,f"; - . 
5 
Government Services ("OGS") in Washington, D.C. In this position, Ms. Hopkins was responsible for helping the firm to win and carry out management consulting con-tracts with federal agencies. She enjoyed a successful career in OGS and, in 1982, was proposed for partnership. In keeping with the firm's established personnel proce-dures, all partners who had worked with Ms. Hopkins were asked to submit written comments to the firm's Admissions Committee. These evaluations were written on so-called "long forms" by those partners who knew Ms. Hopkins well, and on "short forms" by those who had had only passing contact with her. The evaluations covered a range of considerations, including both technical skills and personal interactions. The Admissions Committee was then responsible for sorting through these forms, summarizing the various comments, and submitting rec-ommendations to the firm's Policy Board. The Policy Board, in turn, was to decide whether to reject the candi-date outright, "hold" her candidacy for another year or submit the candidate for a vote by the full partnership . See 618 F. Supp. at 1111-12 (recounting partnership review process). 
Ms. Hopkins' record at the firm documented outstand-ing accomplishments as a senior manager. At the first trial in this case, the District Court found that Ms. Hop-kins "played a key role in Price Waterhouse's successful effort to win a multi-million dollar contract with the Department of State." Id. at 1112. Moreover, 
[s]he had no difficulty dealing with clients and her clients appear to have been very pleased with her work. None of the other partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year had a comparable record in terms of successfully securing major contracts for the partnership. . . . She was generally viewed as a highly competent project leader who worked long hours, pushed vigorously to meet deadlines and demanded much from the multidisciplinary staffs with which she worked. 
Id. at 1112-13. 
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A number of the comments submitted by partners, how-
ever, also criticized Ms. Hopkins' "interpersonal skills," 
suggesting that she was sometimes overbearing and abra-
sive. Some of these comments went further in suggesting 
that these defects were especially inappropriate because 
Hopkins was a woman. As the Supreme Court noted in 
its review of this case: 
One partner described her as "macho"; another sug-
gested that she "overcompensated for being a 
woman"; a third advised her to take "a course at 
charm school." Several partners criticized her use of 
profanity; in response, one partner suggested that 
those partners objected to her swearing only "because 
it[']s a lady using foul language." Another supporter 
explained that Hopkins "ha[ d] matured from a 
tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr 
to an authoritative, formidable, but much more 
appealing lady ptr candidate." 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1782 (1989) 
(plurality opinion) ( citations omitted). 
In March 1983, Price Waterhouse's Policy Board voted 
not to admit Ms. Hopkins as a partner. Rather than dis-
miss her outright, however, the Board decided to "hold" 
her candidacy, with the possibility that she might be 
reconsidered the following year. "When [Hopkins] con-
sulted with the head partner at OGS, who was her strong-
est supporter and responsible for telling her what 
problems the Policy Board had identified with her candi-
dacy, she was advised to walk ·more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her 
hair sty'led, and wear jewelry." 618 F. Supp. at 1117 (foot-
note omitted; emphasis added). 
Ms. Hopkins remained at Price Waterhouse but then 
ran into conflicts with some of the partners. Donald Epel-
baum, one of the · partners in appellee's home office, 
accused Ms. Hopkins of misrepresenting a conversation 
she had had with Price Waterhouse's managing partner 
concerning her partnership prospects. 737 F. Supp. at 
1212-13. These conflicts culminated in a decision not to 
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repropose Ms. Hopkins for partnership the following year. 
Ms. Hopkins then resigned and later brought this suit. 
Following the first trial in 1985, the District Court held 
that Ms. Hopkins had proved that sex stereotyping had 
infected the decisionmaking process among Price Water-
house's partners and that Price Waterhouse could avoid 
equitable relief only if it could show, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, that it would have reached the same nega-
tive decision regarding Ms. Hopkins' candidacy even 
absent the sex stereotyping. See 618 F. Supp. at 1120. The 
trial court went on, however, to hold that Price Water-
house's subsequent decision not to renominate Ms. Hop-
kins was nondiscriminatory, id. at 1115, and that Ms. 
Hopkins' resignation was not a constructive discharge, id. 
at 1121. Consequently, the trial court held that Ms. Hop-
kins was not entitled to back pay for the period following 
her resignation. Id. 
On appeal, a panel of this court found "ample support 
in. the record for the District Court's finding that the part-
nership selection process at Price Waterhouse was imper-
missibly infected by stereotypical attitudes towards female 
candidates." 825 F.2d at 468. We also held, contrary to 
the trial court, that a showing by Price Waterhouse, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that it would have deferred 
Ms. Hopkins' candidacy regardless of her sex would result 
in Price Waterhouse avoiding Title VII liability alto-
gether, not simply equitable relief. See 825 F.2d at 471-72. 
Finally, this court held that, on the record before the trial 
court, Ms. Hopkins was constructively discharged when 
Price Waterhouse informed her that she would not be 
renominated; as a result, we held that any remedy to 
which Ms. Hopkins was entitled should cover the period 
following her resignation. Id. at 472-73. This court then 
remanded the case to the District Court to fashion an 
appropriate remedy. Id. at 473. 
Following our initial review of this case, the Supreme 
Court granted . certiorari and considered the case. The 
Court upheld the District Court's finding that sex discrim-
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ination had tainted Price Waterhouse's decisionmaking. 
See 109 S. Ct. at 1791, 1793 (plurality opinion); id. at 
1802, 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). It 
agreed that "a number of the partners' comments showed 
sex stereotyping at work," see id. at 1791 (plurality opin-
ion), and stated forcefully that "we are beyond the day 
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming 
or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated 
with their group," id. The Court then ruled that Price 
Waterhouse could avoid liability if it could show - by a 
preponderance of the evidence - that it would have 
reached the same decision absent any discrimination, see 
id. at 1792 (plurality opinion); id. at 1796 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment). Because the District Court 
had not evaluated the evidence by that standard, the 
Court remanded the case for reconsideration pursuant to 
the proper evidentiary standard. Id. at 1793 (plurality 
opinion). 
On remand, Judge Gesell offered to allow either side to 
introduce new evidence on the question of liability, but 
both parties elected to have the District Court rule on the 
basis of the evidence already in the record from the first 
trial. 737 F. Supp. at 1204. Judge Gesell then ruled that 
he was not persuaded, even by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that Price Waterhouse would have denied Ms. 
Hopkins' candidacy for partnership in 1983 had Hopkins 
not been a woman and that Price Waterhouse was there-
fore liable under Title VII. Id. at 1206-07. In fashioning 
a remedy, Judge Gesell held that he was bound, by the 
law of the case doctrine and the law of the circuit, to find 
that Ms. Hopkins had been constructively discharged by 
Price Waterhouse. Id. at 1208. Based in part on that find-
ing, he then ordered that Ms. Hopkins be awarded 
$371,175 in back pay (an amount that reflected reductions 
on grounds of equity and inadequate mitigation), attor-
neys fees and a partnership in Price Waterhouse. Id. at 
1209-17. 
Price Waterhouse now presses five arguments on 
appeal. It argues (1) that the District Court clearly erred 
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9 
in finding that Price Waterhouse did not meet its burden 
of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that it 
would have deferred Ms. Hopkins' candidacy for partner-
ship even if it had not considered Ms. Hopkins' gender; 
(2) that the District Court misapplied the law of the case 
doctrine in holding that Ms. Hopkins was constructively 
discharged; (3) that the District Court had no power to 
order partnership as a Title VII remedy; ( 4) that, even if 
the court had this remedial authority, ordering a partner-
ship was inequitable on the facts of this case; and (5) that 
the District Court erred in its calculation of the back pay 
to which Ms. Hopkins is entitled. We find no merit in any 
of these contentions. Finding no error in the District 
Court's judgment, we affirm. 
IL ANALYSIS 
A. Liability 
Price Waterhouse raises two objections to the District 
Court's finding of liability. First, it asserts that the trial 
court did not carry out the Supreme Court's instruction 
that it reevaluate the evidence pursuant to the preponder-
ance standard. Specifically, Price Waterhouse asserts that 
the trial court sidestepped its responsibility to reweigh the 
evidence by emphasizing Price Waterhouse's failure to 
produce new evidence suggesting that it was moved by 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory concerns in denying Ms. 
Hopkins partnership in March 1983. Second, it asserts 
that, even if the trial court did reweigh the evidence, it 
committed clear error in not being persuaded by Price 
Waterhouse's showing. We disagree on both counts. 
As to Price Waterhouse's first contention, a fair reading 
of Judge Gesell's opinion shows that he did in fact 
"reweigh" the evidence and that he simply found it 
unpersuasive.1 Judge Gesell based his finding that appel-
1Judge Gesell prefaced his factfinding as follows: "[T]he Court, 
after reviewing the transcript of the original trial and considering 
the briefs and arguments of counsel, reaches the following findings 
of fact and conclusions of law .... " 737 F. Supp. at 1204 (empha-
sis added). 
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lant did not carry its burden of persuasion in part on 
Price Waterhouse's failure to differentiate between evalu-
ations of Ms. Hopkins that were "tainted by sexism" and 
those that reflected legitimate, nondiscriminatory con-
cerns. See 737 F. Supp. at 1206-07. This finding could 
hardly have come as a surprise to Price Waterhouse. The 
earlier judicial opinions in this case put Price Waterhouse 
on notice that it was virtually impossible on the basis of 
the original trial record to discern the extent to which sex 
stereotyping had pervaded Price Waterhouse's evaluations 
of Ms. Hopkins. See 618 F. Supp. at 1117 (noting that 
plaintiff's "well qualified expert" "did not purport to be 
able to determine whether or not any particular reaction 
[ to Hopkins] was determined by the operation of sex 
stereotypes"); 825 F.2d at 464 ("The trial judge acknowl-
edged that it was impossible to measure the precise role 
sexual stereotyping had played .. . . "). Thus, when the 
case returned to the trial court on remand from the 
Supreme Court, Price Waterhouse had reason to know 
that, based on the evidence it had proffered so far, the 
trial court was likely unable to separate out the impermis-
sible reasons for appellant's employment decision in order 
to see if the reasons that remained would have led to the 
same result. 
Price Waterhouse might have helped to tip the balance 
in its favor by introducing its own expert testimony or by 
offering some more objective evidence in support of its 
case. Cf. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1791 ("[I]n most cases, the 
employer should -be able to present some objective evi-
dence as to its · probable decision in the absence of an 
impermissible motive.") (footnote omitted). Nonetheless, 
Price Waterhouse declined the opportunity to present new 
evidence and chose to rest its case on the evidence previ-
ously submitted - evidence that the trial court found left 
the issue of liability, at best, in equipoise. See 737 F. Supp. 
at 1206. 
The approach taken by Judge Gesell appears perfectly 
consistent with the instructions he received from the 
Supreme Court. The Court's plurality opinion expressly 
5. ;; -.. : .--t· - , • 
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acknowledged the possibility that a court, unable to sepa-
rate the permissible from impermissible motivations of an 
employer, would hold against the employer. Drawing an 
analogy to the Court's treatment of mixed-motive cases 
under the National Labor Relations Act, the opinion 
noted: 
It is fair that [the employer] bear the risk that the 
influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be sepa-
rated, because he knowingly created the risk and 
because the risk was created not by innocent activity 
but by his own wrongdoing. 
109 S. Ct. at 1790 (quoting NLRB v. Transportation Man-
agement Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983)) . 
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the Court's judgment, 
made clear that she, too, believed that it was the employer 
who must carry the burden of separating out the imper-
missible motives from the permissible, and that the deci-
sion must go to the employee should the employer fail to 
c~rry this burden: 
The employer need not isolate the sole cause for the 
decision, rather it must demonstrate that with the 
illegitimate factor removed from the calculus, sufficient 
business reasons would have induced it to take the 
same employment action .... If the employer fails to 
carry this burden, the factfinder is justified in con-
cluding that the decision was made "because of' con-
sideration of the illegitimate factor and the 
substantive standard for liability under the statute is 
satisfied. 
109 S. Ct. at 1804 (O'Connor, J ., concurring in the judg-
ment) (emphasis added). 
Judge Gesell, on remand, effectively invited Price 
Waterhouse to identify and "remove[ ] from the calculus" 
those partnership evaluations that were influenced by ille-
gitimate motivations so that the court could then assess 
whether the remaining legitimate reasons would have led 
to the same employment decision. Price Waterhouse 
declined the invitation, sticking instead to a view that 
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12 
every facially neutral evaluation was legitimate. See 737 
F. Supp. at 1207; see also Brief for Appellant at 15-17; 
Appellant's Reply Brief at 2-3. Since the reliability of that 
evidence already had been properly called into question,2 
and since Judge Gesell found himself unable to separate 
out the illegitimate motives from · the legitimate, he was 
therefore left unpersuaded, even by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that Price Waterhouse would have made the 
same employment decision absent discrimination.3 
2See, e.g., 109 S. Ct. at 1783 (noting that Hopkins' expert wit-
ness suggested that sex stereotyping infected "not only . . . the 
overtly sex-based comments of partners but also ... [facially] 
gender-neutral remarks"). 
3 As one commentator has aptly noted: 
Obviously, in cases such as Hopkins, in which the legiti-
mate reason articulated by the employer was of such a subjec-
tive nature as to itself invite stereotyping, the employer bears 
the additional burden of showing that the stereotyped atti-
tudes did not so pervade the subjective evaluation as to 
destroy the articulated reason's tegitimacy. In cases in which 
such subjective factors as "interpersonal skills" are offered as 
the determining cause for the negative employment decision, 
Justice Brennan's mandate in Hopkins that "the employer 
should be able to present some objective evidence as to its 
probable decision in the absence of an impermissible motive" 
should be adopted. 
Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Posi-
tions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 533 (1990) (quoting 
Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1791; emphasis added by author; footnote 
omitted). 
Justice White suggested in his opinion concurring in the judg-
ment in Hopkins that the employer need not produce objective 
evidence but may rely on its own "credibl[e]" testimony about its 
legitimate motivations, see 109 S. Ct. at 1796 (White, J., concur-
ring in the judgment), a position the plurality found "baffling," see 
id. at 1791 n.14. However, even under the view espoused by Jus-
tice White, we can find no merit in appellant's position: Judge 
Gesell found that, on balance, Price Waterhouse's evidence was 
not sufficiently credible to satisfy its burden of persuasion. We 
cannot possibly say that this finding is . "clearly erroneous." See 
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 290 (1982). When Price 
Waterhouse declined to introduce any new, more objective evi-
dence to resolve the lingering uncertainty, the District Court had 
no grounds to rule against appellee. 
ti{,+rii1il~Jt1~if: 
;· ,:.,_ .-, .•;-, ... .. ,, ; . ··• 
·._. 
-JP_1.;~'.;©, 
:..t<: ·~ · • .. - ._, 
•:··-~'+/ -~-~~'-~~: ....... ·--
:. .:... 
. •:~ . ·•. . .... , 
·;./, '· 
··l . · . 
·"tf-~--
13 
As Justice O'Connor freely acknowledged, the result in 
a case of this sort may be "strong medicine," see 109 S. 
Ct. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), 
but it is the price that employers must pay "in cases such 
as this one where the employer has created uncertainty 
as to causation by knowingly giving substantial weight to 
an impermissible criterion," id. at 1796. Therefore, we 
reject Price Waterhouse's contention that Judge Gesell 
failed to "weigh" the evidence. Judge Gesell expressly did 
review the trial record, see 737 F. Supp. at 1204, found 
that it left "uncertainty on the point now at issue," see 
id. at 1206, and, Price Waterhouse having declined the 
opportunity to add to the record or clarify the uncer-
tainty, resolved that doubt against the employer. That is 
precisely what Judge Gesell was instructed to do. 
This leaves only Price Waterhouse's alternative argu-
ment that Judge Gesell "failed to give sufficient weight to 
Price Waterhouse's evidence" in his reconsideration. Brief 
for Appellant at 15. To the extent that Price Waterhouse 
invites us to make our own de novo determination of the . 
facts, we decline. We review Judge Gesell's findings con-
cerning Price Waterhouse's motivations mindful of the 
Supreme Court's instruction that they should be set aside 
only if they rise to the level of clear error. See Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 290 (1982). Under this 
standard, we can upset Judge Gesell's conclusion that 
Price Waterhouse failed to prove that it would have 
deferred Ms. Hopkins' candidacy for partnership in 1983 
regardless of her sex only if that conclusion " 'is based on 
an utterly implausible account of the evidence.' " 
Underwood v. District of Columbia Armory Bd., 816 F.2d 
769, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Bishopp v. District of 
Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1986)); see also 
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 
(1985) . Here, we find no such flaw. To the contrary, Judge 
Gesell's factfinding reflected balance, deliberation and a 
consideration of the complete record. Therefore, we affirm 
the District Court's finding of liability. 
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B. Finding of Constructive Discharge 
We find no error in Judge Gesell's finding that Ms. Hopkins was constructively discharged when Price Water-house informed her that she would not be renominated for partnership. See 737 F. Supp. at 1208-09. Price Water-house claims that the District Court misapplied the law of the case doctrine in adhering to this court's earlier rul-ing on the constructive discharge question because, fol-lowing the Supreme Court's reversal on the separate liability issue, this court vacated its earlier "mandate." See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, No. 85-6052 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 1989) (available on Westlaw at 1989 WL 105318). Price Waterhouse argues that, by vacating its "mandate," this court vacated its earlier opinion, including the unappealed question of constructive discharge. 
We agree with the District Court that Price Waterhouse is mistaken in asserting an identity between our 1987 opinion and the mandate it contained. See 737 F. Supp. at 1207-08. Furthermore, it is sufficient to point out that the District Court grounded its finding of constructive dis-charge both in the law of the case doctrine and in the fact that this court's earlier constructive discharge ruling has since become the established law of the circuit. See id. at 1208.4 Thus, even if the trial court had not been bound by the law of the case, it was nonetheless bound by the law of the circuit. Under these circumstances, we find that, quite aside from the law of the case doctrine, the District Court acted properly in adopting this court's ear-lier holding on constructive discharge.5 
4The District Court pointed out that six cases in this circuit have adopted the constructive discharge rule set out in this court's 1987 Hopkins opinion. See 737 F. Supp. at 1208 n.7 (listing cases). Judge Gesell then noted: "If the unappealed findings by the Court of Appeals[] reflect a legal standard for purposes of other cases, surely this Court is bound to comply." Id. at 1208. We agree. 5See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 646 n.10 (1979) (Powell, J ., dissenting) (" Although a decision vacating a judgment necessarily prevents the opinion of the lower court from 
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C. Partnership as a Remedy Under Title VII 
Price Waterhouse also asserts that the District Court 
had no authority to order admission to partnership to 
remedy a Title VII violation. Price Waterhouse's argu-
ment is apparently that while Title VII extends far 
enough to protect an employee against discrimination in 
partnership consideration, it comes to an abrupt halt once 
a violation has been found, leaving the employee with the 
promise of fair consideration for partnership but no effec-
tive means of enforcing it. This argument seems absurd 
in the light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hishon v. 
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), in which the Court 
held that "nothing in the change in status that advance-
ment to partnership might entail means that partnership 
consideration falls outside the terms of [Title VII]." Id. 
at 77. Given the Court's judgment in Hishon, and after 
careful review of Title VII, its legislative history and the 
case law interpreting it, we find that the District Court 
clearly acted within the bounds of the remedial authority 
conferred by the statute. 
1. The Terms of Title VII and its Legislative History 
The remedial reach of Title VII is defined broadly in 
section 706(g) of the statute: 
If the court finds that the respondent has intention-
ally engaged in ... an unlawful employment practice 
.. . the court may enjoin the respondent from engag-
ing in such unlawful employment practice, and order 
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which 
may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or 
hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or 
being the law of the case, the expressions of the court below on 
the merits, if not reversed, will continue to have precedential 
weight and, until contrary authority is decided, are likely to be 
viewed as persuasive authority if not the governing law .... ") (ci-
tations omitted); Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 
870 F.2d 1292, 1298-99 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 81 
(1989); Hill v. Western Electric Co., 672 F.2d 381, 388 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 981 (1982) . 
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16 
any other equitable relief as the court deems appro-
priate. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). By its choice of such ex
pan-
sive statutory language, authorizing the courts to "o
rder 
such affirmative action as may be appropriate," Cong
ress 
could hardly have made more plain its intention 
that 
courts exercise broad discretion in crafting effective e
qui-
table remedies for employment discrimination.
6 
The statute's legislative history reinforces this unmi
s-
takable conclusion. A section-by-section analysis of
 the 
1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964
 -
amendments in which Congress revised section 706(g
) by 
adding language underscoring the trial court's discre
tion 
in crafting appropriate remedies - stressed the flex
ible 
nature of the Act's remedial provisions: 
The provisions of this subsection are intended to 
give the courts wide discretion exercising their equita-
ble powers to fashion the most complete relief possi-
6w e do not accept - indeed, we can barely comprehend -
appellant's argument that "[t]he plain language of Title
 VII makes 
clear that Congress did not intend to authorize the
 courts to 
create partnerships to remedy employment discriminat
ion." Brief 
for Appellant at 27-28. We also note that Price Wa
terhouse's 
"plain language" argument smacks of a similar argumen
t that was 
flatly rejected by the Supreme Court in Franks v. Bowm
an Trans-
portation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976): 
It is true that backpay is the only remedy specifically m
en-
tioned in § 706(g). But to draw from this fact and othe
r sec-
tions of the statute any implicit statement by Congres
s that 
seniority relief is a prohibited, or at least less available
, form 
of remedy is not warranted. 
Id. at 764 n.21 (cross-reference omitted); see also 2 A. LA
RsoN & 
L. LARsoN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 55.20, at 11-19 (
rev. ed. 
1990) (" Although Section 706(g) specifically mentions 
only rein-
statement and hiring as two possible remedies under Tit
le VII, the 
courts, in an attempt to return the victim of employme
nt discrim-
ination to his proper status, have also ordered promotio
ns, trans-
fers, mergers of segregated seniority systems, alte
ration or 
abolition of discriminatory seniority or referral systems,
 and other 
miscellaneous forms of affirmative relief."). 
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ble .... [T]he scope of relief ... is intended to make 
the victims of unlawful discrimination whole ... [and] 
so far as possible, [restore them] to a position where 
they would have been were it not for the unlawful dis-
crimination. 
118 CoNG. REC. 7168 (1972). The Supreme Court has 
found in this language "emphatic confirmation that fed-
eral courts are empowered to fashion such relief as the 
particular circumstances of a case may require to effect 
restitution, making whole insofar as possible the victims 
of . . . discrimination in hiring." Franks v. Bowman 
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976) (footnote omitted); 
see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 420-
21 (1975) (finding that this history "strongly reaffirmed 
the 'make whole' purpose of Title VII") .7 . 
2. The Case Law Construing the Remedial Authority of 
the Courts Under Title VII 
Every indication from the case law suggests that section 
706(g) is to be construed so as to authorize the courts to 
grant "make whole" relief to victims of unlawful discrimi-
nation. As the Court noted in Albemarle Paper: 
It is ... the purpose of Title VII to make persons 
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful 
employment discrimination. This is shown by the 
very fact that Congress took care to arm the courts 
7Congress' broad remedial intentions are similarly reflected in 
the portion of the 1972 amendments vesting the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") with administrative 
enforcement powers. The Senate report explaining that provision 
noted: 
It is the committee's view that this authority be broadly 
construed with the view toward completely rooting out and 
eliminating employment discrimination. The Commission is 
to take whatever affirmative steps are needed to provide a full 
and complete remedy to the aggrieved party or class and to 
obtain full and immediate compliance with the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. 
S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1971) . 
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18 
with full equitable powers. For it is the historic pur-
pose of equity to "secur[e] complete justice," Brown 
v. Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 503 (1836); see also Porter v. 
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397-398 (1946). 
"[W]here federally protected rights have been 
invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that 
courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to 
grant the necessary relief." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 
684 (1946). 
422 U.S. at 418; see also Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d 153, 
156 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (emphasizing importance of flexible, 
complete relief under Title VII). The obvious point here 
is that, to the fullest extent possible, Title VII authorizes 
courts to put a victim of discrimination in the position 
that she or he would have been in but for the unlawful 
discrimination. That is exactly what the District Court did 
in this case. 
In crafting a remedy under Title VII, a court must first, 
of course, identify the precise injury caused by the dis-
crimination and then shape a remedy that will, as much 
as possible, erase that injury. See Albemarle Paper, 422 
U.S. at 418 (" 'The general rule is, that when a wrong has 
been done, and the law gives a remedy, the compensation 
shall be equal to the injury. The latter is the standard by 
which the former is to be measured.' ") ( quoting Wicker 
v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867); original capi-
talization restored). In the context of this case, Judge 
Gesell's finding of liability rested upon his conclusion that 
Ms. Hopkins would have been made a Price Waterhouse 
partner in March 1983 were it not for the invidious influ-
ence of sex stereotyping in the firm's decisionmaking. 
Therefore, it is apparent that an invitation to join the 
Price · Waterhouse partnership would be "the most com-
plete relief possible" and in fact the only possible relief 
that would restore Ann Hopkins to "the situation [s]he 
would have occupied if the wrong .had not been 
committed." Id. at 419 (quoting Wicker, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 
at 99).8 
8Price Waterhouse is simply wrong when it asserts, rather inex-
plicably, that "ordering that an employee be transformed into a 
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"The District Court's decision [in crafting a Title VII 
remedy] must ... be measured against the purposes which 
inform Title VII." Albemarl,e Paper, 422 U.S. at 417. Time 
and again, the Supreme Court has instructed that a com-
plete remedy "should be denied only for reasons which, 
if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statu-
tory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout 
the economy and making persons whole for injuries suf-
fered through past discrimination." See id. at 421 (foot-
note omitted) (discussing back pay); see also International 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365 
(1977) (seniority relief); Franks, 424 U.S. at 771 (seniority 
relief). In addition to those two pervading statutory pur-
poses, we note that one of the specific congressional con-
cerns animating the 1972 amendments to Title VII was 
the need to tear down discriminatory barriers in the top 
echelons of the job market that continued to prevent 
women and minorities from "ascend[ing] the higher rungs 
in professional and other life." See 118 Co NG. REc. 3802 
(1972) (remarks of Sen. Javits); see also Bartholet, 
Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. 
L. REv. 945, 980-83 (1982). We would directly subvert 
what Congress intended in the 1972 amendments if we 
were to hold that partnership could not be awarded to a 
person who was denied it because of unlawful 
discrimination. 
9 
partner, rather than reinstated as an employee and recons
idered 
for partnership, 'catapult[s] [the employee] into a better po
sition 
than [she] would have enjoyed in the absence of discriminat
ion.'" 
Brief for Appellant at 31 (quoting Ford Motor Co. u. EEOC
, 458 
U.S. 219, 234 (1982)). The District Court's finding of discri
mina-
tion was based upon Price Waterhouse's decision to "hold"
 Hop- · 
kins' candidacy in March 1983 rather than make her partne
r, i.e., 
it found that "in the absence of discrimination" Hopkins 
would 
have been made a partner in 1983. Thus, making her a pa
rtner 
now would not put her in a "better position" than she would 
have 
been in absent the discrimination. 
9Monetary relief alone may be inadequate both as a deterre
nt 
and as a form of compensation. As Judge Gesell noted in the
 con-
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3. The Hishon Decision 
. · .. .. ·: ,.Y./ .· : ... : ..... 
As we have noted above, the Supreme Court in Hishon 
has already decided that Title VII does intrude into a 
partnership's admission decisions if it can be shown that 
a denial of partnership was based on prohibited discrimi-
nation. Indeed, the Supreme Court was unanimous in 
rejecting the view that "partnership" was beyond the 
reach of Title VII: 
RP-spondent contends that advancement to partner-
ship 1.uay never qualify as a term, condition, or privi-
lege of employment for purposes of Title VII. First, 
respondent asserts that elevation to partnership 
entails a change in status from an "employee" to an 
"employer." However, even if respondent is correct 
that a partnership invitation is not itself an offer of 
employment, Title VII would nonetheless apply and 
preclude discrimination on the basis of sex. The bene-
fit a plaintiff is denied need not be employment to fall 
within Title VII's protection; it need only be a term, 
condition, or privilege of employment. It is als.o of no 
consequence that employment as an associate neces-
sarily ends when an associate becomes a partner. A 
benefit need not accrue before a person's employment 
is completed to be a term, condition, or privilege of 
that employment relationship. Pension benefits, for 
example, qualify as terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment even though they are received only after 
employment terminates. Accordingly, nothing in the 
change in status that advancement to partnership 
might entail means that partnership consideration 
falls outside the terms of the statute . 
text of this case, even if monetary relief could be crafted with pre-
cision, it may nonetheless fall short of fully compensating 
Hopkins for the opportunity she was denied by Price Waterhouse. 
See 737 F. Supp. at 1211; see also Note, Tenure and Partnership 
as Title VII Remedies, 94 HARV. L. R.Ev. 457, 465-66 (1980) (dis-
cussing inability of monetary damages to compensate for lost 
prestige and career continuity and its inadequacy in fully deterring 
"deep-pocket" defendants) . 
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Second, respondent argues that Title VII categori-
cally exempts partnership decisions from scrutiny. 
However, respondent points to nothing in the statute 
or the legislative history that would support such a 
per se exemption. When Congress wanted to grant an 
employer complete immunity, it expressly did so. 
Third, respondent argues that application of Title 
VII in this case would infringe constitutional rights 
of expression or association. Although we have recog-
nized that the activities of lawyers may make a 
"distinctive contribution . . . to the ideas and beliefs 
of our society," respondent has not shown how its 
ability to fulfill such a function would be inhibited by 
a requirement that it consider petitioner for partner-
ship on her merits. Moreover, as we have held in 
another context, "[i]nvidious private discrimination 
may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom 
of association protected by the First Amendment, but 
it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional 
protections." There is no constitutional right, for 
example, to discriminate in the selection of who may 
attend a private school or join a labor union. 
467 U.S. at 77-78 (citations and footnotes omitted; 
emphasis in original). 
In light of the Court's holdings in Hislwn, the answer 
to the question whether Title VII will afford a complete 
remedy once it is found that admission to partnership has 
been denied due to prohibited discrimination seems self-
evident. In fact, it would be impossible to reconcile a 
denial of this remedial authority with the Court's 
resounding affirmation in Hislwn that Title VII promises 
employees nondiscriminatory consideration for partner-
ship where consideration is held out as a privilege of 
employment. The mere fact that elevation to partnership 
may place the beneficiary beyond Title VII's protective 
reach10 in no way proves that Title VII is powerless to ele-
1°W e note - without reaching the question ourselves - that 
some courts have held that partners are not "employees" under 
Title VII and that discrimination directed against partners is 
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22 
vate a victim of discrimination to that position in the first 
place. This is precisely the point that was made by Chief 
Justice Burger for a unanimous Court in Hishon. 11 
. therefore beyond the reach of the statute. See Wheeler v. Burd-
man, 825 F.2~ 257 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987); 
EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984); 
Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977); cf. Hyland v. 
New Haven Radiology Associates, P.C., 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 
1986). We recognize, however, that a woman in Hopkins' position 
may find protection under the statute should she be admitted to 
the partnership on unequal terms or suffer retaliation upon 
becoming a partner based upon her previous assertion of Title VII 
rights. Under such conditions, the admission to partnership may 
amount to a subterfuge for discriminating against an employee 
and the victim of discrimination arguably would remain protected 
by the statute. Cf. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79 n.2 (Powell, J., concur-
ring) ("Of course, an employer may not evade the strictures of 
Title VII simply by labeling its employees as 'partners.' "); 
Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 261, 277 (holding partners are not 
"employees" under Title VII, but distinguishing the case where an 
employee might be made a partner as "a sham" to enable subse-
quent discrimination). 
11Furthermore, the remedial power of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act ("NLRA ") - which the Supreme Court has consulted 
regularly in construing the reach of Title VIl's section 706(g) -
has been construed to include the power to elevate an unlawfully 
discharged worker to a position that is itself beyond the scope of 
the NLRA. In Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers lnt'l Union v. 
NLRB, 547 F.2d 575, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. 
Angle v. NLRB, 431 U.S. 966 (1977), this court held that, under 
the NLRA, "an employee who is illegally discharged and who, but 
for that discharge, would have been promoted to a supervisory 
position" must be "reinstated to [that] supervisory ·position," even 
though the NLRA does not itself protect supervisory employees. 
See also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 187-89 
(1973) (illegally discharged employee who would have been made 
an independent contractor but for the discharge may be reinstated 
as an independent contractor under the NLRA, even though that 
status would take employee outside the Act's protections). Thus, 
the mere fact that Title VII might not regulate relationships 
among partners does not refute the statute's power to elevate an 
employee to partnership as a remedy for a clear statutory viola-
tion. 
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It is, of course, true, as Justice Powell noted in his con-
currence to Hishon, that a partnership rel,ationship is 
"markedly" different from the relationship of an employer 
and employee. See 467 U.S. at 79 (Powell, J ., concurring). 
But this consideration is not controlling in this case. The 
instant case involves only an employee's elevation to part-
nership; it does not involve Ms. Hopkins' retention of 
partnership or the regulation of the relationship among 
partners at Price Waterhouse. Thus, we are not con-
fronted by the concerns expressed in Justice Powell's con-
curring opinion. Justice Powell emphasized that the Court 
in Hishon did not reach the question whether Title VII 
protects employees after they become partners; nor do we 
reach that question in this case. 
4. The EEOC's Position 
It is also noteworthy that the EEOC, the agency to 
which we owe deference in construing Title VII, see EEOC 
v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988), 
agrees with our construction of the remedial reach of Title 
VII. This is significant because Congress has recognized 
"the importance of administrative expertise relating to the 
resolution of problems of employment discrimination." S . 
REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1971). In explaining 
Congress' decision to grant the EEOC administrative 
enforcement powers, the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare observed that "[m]any of the Title .VII 
proceedings involve complex labor relations and business 
operations issues particul,arly in the fashioning of the rem-
edies for eliminating discrimination. The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission would be expected to 
develop an important reservoir of expertise in these mat-
ters, expertise which would not readily be available to a · 
widespread court system." Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added). 
The EEOC has applied its expertise to the question 
before us and has concluded that Title VII authorizes 
court-ordered elevation to partnership as a remedy for the 
discriminatory denial of partnership. See Brief of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus 
C: 1 ~ . ;~·;. 
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Curiae at 18-23. The EEOC's view reinforces our own 
independent reading of the statute. See Lander, 888 F.2d 
at 157 (taking note of EEOC position in construing reme-
dial reach of Title VII). 
5. Conclusion on Partnership as a Remedy Under Title 
VII 
All of the foregoing considerations lead us to conclude 
that the ordering of a partnership is consonant with the 
broad remedial goals of Title VII and with" '[t]he general 
rule . . . that when a wrong has been done, and the law 
gives a remedy, the compensation shall be equal to the 
injury.'" Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 418 (quoting Wicker 
v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867)). 
D. Constitutional, Contractual and Equitable Consider-
ations 
Although all signposts in the statute, its legislative his-
tory and the case law point strongly toward affirming the 
District Court's judgment to order partnership, thereby 
vindicating "[t]he 'make whole' purpose of Title VII," id. 
at 419, Price Waterhouse urges that there are several 
countervailing considerations weighing against this con-
clusion. We consider them in turn. 
1. Freedom of Association 
Price Waterhouse argues that a court order forcing it 
to accept Ann Hopkins as a partner would violate its part-
ners' constitutional rights of free association. This argu-
ment is entirely unpersuasive. Even assuming arguendo 
that a large business partnership such as Price Water-
house has cognizable associational rights, they must yield 
to the compelling national interest in eradicating discrimi-
nation. See, e.g., New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New 
York, 487 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary 
Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) 
("Even if [ the forced admission of women members] does 
work some slight infringement on Rotary members' right 
of expressive association, that infringement is justified 
because it serves the State's compelling interest in elimi-
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25 
nating discrimination against women."); Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976). 
It is difficult to differentiate between the constitutional 
argument Price Waterhouse advances here and the one 
rejected in a nearly identical setting in Hishon. There, 
King & Spalding, a large law partnership, had similarly 
insisted that "application of Title VII in [its] case would 
infringe constitutional rights of expression or 
association." 467 U.S. at 78. The Supreme Court brushed 
aside the argument, noting that "'[i]nvidious private dis-
crimination may be characterized as a form of exercising 
freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, 
but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional 
protections.'" Id. (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 
455, 470 (1973)) . 
On the basis of the foregoing authorities, we reject 
Price Waterhouse's suggestion that its claimed freedom of 
association precludes the court from ordering partnership 
as a Title VII remedy. 
2. Principl,es of Contract Law 
Price Waterhouse also points out that courts have tra-
ditionally been reluctant to order the creation of a part-
nership as an equitable remedy for breach of contract, and 
urges that this contract principle be carried over into the 
realm of antidiscrimination law. It is true that in common 
law contract cases the courts have hesitated to compel 
persons to work together or to enforce other ongoing 
human relationships, including partnerships. But this 
contract principle is not grounded in the peculiar nature 
of partnerships but rather extends to all "personal 
service" contracts, see Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infu-
said, Inc., 739 F.2d 661, 668 (1st Cir. 1984), including sim-
ple employment relationships. Thus, citing the same 
principle, courts have refused to order employers to rein-
state employees as a remedy for the breach of an employ-
ment contract. See, e.g., Zannis v. Lake Shore Radiowgists, 
Ltd., 73 Ill. App. 3d 901, 392 N.E.2d 126, 128-29 (1979); 
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Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 177 Md. 248, 254-56, 9 A.2d 639, 641-42 (1939); Sprunt v. Members of the Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Tenn., 223 Tenn. 210, 443 S.W.2d 464, 466 (1969) . 
Title VII makes expressly clear, however, that this com-mon law rule does not limit a court's power to fashion equitable remedies for employment discrimination in vio-lation of the statute. Price Waterhouse concedes, as it must, that the "plain language" of Title VII contemplates judicial authority to order reinstatement and hiring of employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). Thus, even under appellant's analysis, it is plain that there is no merit to the argument that common law principles of con-tract law serve to limit Title VII's remedial reach. 12 
3. The Equities of this Case 
Lastly, Price Waterhouse argues that even if the Dis-trict Court was empowered under Title VII to order part-nership as a remedy, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to do so on the facts of this case. Specifically, appel-lant argues that Ms. Hopkins' own alleged misconduct13 
12Moreover, even in the context of traditional contract law, "[t]here is a substantial body of authority that endorses specific performance when breach by the employer would undermine an important public interest. Specific performance may be ordered to remedy civil-rights violations .... " E . YORIO, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS § 14.4.1.3, at 381 (1989). Commentators have also suggested that the rising availability of reinstatement under statutory schemes such as Title VII has led to an erosion of the traditional contract rule upon which Price Waterhouse relies. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 16-5, at 667-68 (3d ed. 1987) ("In view of these developments, the reasons behind the traditional bar against a court decree ordering an employer to perform are questionable.") (footnote omitted). 
13The District Court found that Ms. Hopkins had "misstated the substance of a meeting . .. between herself and Joseph E. Con-nor, the Chairman and Senior Partner of Price Waterhouse, regarding her partnership prospects. Ms. Hopkins misleadingly implied that Mr. Connor had disparaged certain partners who opposed her candidacy and that he had warned of the adverse consequences his partners might experience for opposing her the next year." 737 F. Supp. at 1213 . 
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following the March 1983 decision to defer her candidacy 
made her eventual elevation to partnership impossible 
and precludes the court from now making Ms. Hopkins 
a partner. We do not agree . 
The misconduct to which Price Waterhouse refers 
occurred only after Price Waterhouse's own illegal sex 
discrimination had intervened to deny Ms. Hopkins her 
place in the partnership. Given the findings of sex dis-
crimination committed by appellant's partners, there is a 
certain hint of irony in the moral indignation with which 
Price Waterhouse protests the prospect of having to offer 
partnership to a person who allegedly misstated the sub-
stance of a conversation. We also note that Price Water-
house does not claim that, if Ms. Hopkins had been 
admitted to partnership in March 1983, her subsequent 
alleged misconduct would have justified her dismissal 
from partnership. 
Yet, with these observations aside, we find that the Dis-
trict Court expressly considered Ms. Hopkins' alleged 
misconduct in the shaping of its equitable remedy, deduct-
ing from her back pay award any "claim for the fiscal year 
1983-1984." 737 F. Supp. at 1213. We review this judg-
ment under the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion 
standard, see Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 424, and, on 
the record before us, we can find no basis to overturn the 
. trial court's decision. For us to reject the District Court's 
judgment on this issue would be a flagrant disregard of 
the obvious limits of the abuse-of-discretion standard. 
Judge Gesell not only limited back pay, he was careful 
to consider · whether there existed too much hostility 
between the parties to permit an effective working rela-
tionship; he found there did not. See 737 F; Supp. at 1210. · 
He also considered alternative remedies, such as front 
pay, and concluded that it would be impossible to tailor 
a prospective remedy so that Ms. Hopkins truly would be 
made whole. Id. at 1211. Finally, he considered and 
rejected Price Waterhouse's contention that Ms. Hopkins 
is entitled only to reconsideration for partnership by Price 
. ;_ -~ ..', · ·• • '. , . 
.. . · ... 
·• .. : . .. :..... 
.. 
. ;, r 
.· ·_·r1: . 
.. 
. ,:,\,' 
.~ --~ f 
-~~i·'.t ··;,t 
- .· .. N•· 
. ". 
. -~ · .. 
o; ::1:.?_: .. 
-
•. 
- : :· -."-!-





. : - --~ 
,;f._:k:;~ :;/~i/~}} 
'.~.::~, ~~:~:. -·1J?/j_ 
\; f .. ' •· ·._ 
~-:.:'rr~\-···~ ' . 
..... ·- :_J-i. , ~ .. ;.-
· ~ : I • ·, : 
- ' . t · .. . -·, ... 7 · l _ i 




Waterhouse, finding that ordering reconsideration in this case would be "futile and unjust." Id. at 1210-11; see also id. at 1209 n.9. We find no abuse of discretion by Judge Gesell in ordering a partnership based on the facts of the case before him. 
E. Calculation of Back Pay 
Finally, we find no error or abuse of discretion in the District Court's calculation of Ms. Hopkins' back pay award. In particular, we find that Judge Gesell properly accounted for Ms. Hopkins' inadequate mitigation in for-mulating the award. 
The mitigation requirement of Title VII provides that "[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5{g) (1988) (emphasis added). This is precisely the formula Judge Gesell applied: he first found that Ms. Hopkins' maximum earning potential following her departure from Price Waterhouse - i.e., the "amount[ ]' earnable with reasonable diligence" in her case -was $100,000 per year, and he then reduced her back pay award by that amount. 737 F. Supp. at 1215. 
The fact that courts have sometimes denied back pay altogether to Title VII plaintiffs who could have found work but declined to do so, see, e.g., Sangster u. United Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981), is irrelevant. Judge Gesell found that Ms. Hopkins could not have found a job with pay equal to what she would have earned as a Price Waterhouse partner. See 737 F. Supp. at 1215. That fact distinguishes her case from others where plaintiffs failed to seek jobs that would have compensated them completely for their losses and elected instead to remain unemployed. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982) (plaintiffs forfeited back pay after refusing employer's unconditional offer to reinstate them to the jobs from which they had been fired); Ford v. Nicks, 866 F.2d 865, 874 (6th Cir. 1989) {plaintiff forfeited claim to back pay after refusing 
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job that "paid slightly more" than job she was discrimina-torily denied); cf. Donnelly u. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 874 F.2d 402, 411 (7th Cir. 1989) (to cut off back pay lia-bility, the employer must show "that with the exercise of reasonable diligence there was a reasonable chance the employee might have found comparable employment, the earnings of which would offset any damages awarded") (em-phasis added), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 1566 (1990). While it is true that the trial judge found that Ms. Hopkins could have earned more than she did upon leaving Price Water-house, he properly took that fact into account by reducing her back pay award by the "amount[] earnable with rea-sonable diligence." See Ensor v. Painter, 661 F. Supp. 21, 24 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) ("[T]he Court finds that plaintiff Ensor has maintained a lower salary at her subsequent employment for nearly two years without evidence of hav-ing sought a higher-salaried position. Therefore, the Court finds that . . . her award of back pay should be adjusted accordingly."). On this record, we can find no reason to disturb the District Court's calculation of back pay. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 
So ordered . 
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HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring: I concur in the majority's decision but only because the narrow scope of our review compels affirmance. The dis-trict court found as a fact that the decision to defer con-sideration of Hopkins's partnership candidacy was a product of intentional discrimination. While I view that finding as highly questionable, in light of the all but over-whelming evidence that the decision resulted from Hop-kins's own, well-attested personality deficiencies,1 I cannot say it is "based on an utterly implausible account 1Hopkins's difficulty in working with other employees is clearly 
established in the record and was repeatedly cited in the written 
assessments of Price Waterhouse partners as the reason for voting 
against partnership. See J .A. 37 -45. As the district court expressly 
found: 
During the review of Ms. Hopkins' candidacy by the Admissions Committee it was apparent that, although there was considerable respect for her abilities and record of achievement and a recognition of the benefits she had brought to the firm, she ranked very low on her personal interrelations. Even some partners who were most familiar with her work and were strongly urging the Committee and Board to recommend her for partnership in the interests of the firm commented pointedly on her inability to get along with staff and partners. 
737 F. Supp. at 1205. illustrative of Hopkins's treatment of those 
with whom she worked are the following incidents: (1) during a 
telephone conversation with a fellow employee, Hopkins 
"screamed obscenities to him, four letter words, continuous stream 
of them for up to 45 minutes," J.A. 76; (2) during a lunch with 
the chief partner in her section and another partner, she volun-
teered a lengthy and "vitriolic" critique of her co-workers, "going 
through the entire professional staff in our office and giving us 
a read-out on the difficulties that the people exposed or she had . 
experienced with them or that she viewed them," J.A. 80; (3) while 
viewing :Q1Sterials produced by an outside graphics contractor who 
had contracted with Price Waterhouse for years, Hopkins so criti-
cized his work, "express[ing] herself fairly directly," that he after-
ward called a senior manager fearful he was going to lose the Price 
Waterhouse account, J.A. 141; and (4) at the top of a flow chart 
she received, Hopkins, gratuitously it appears, wrote a personal, 
and obscene, remark about a fellow employee, J.A. 140. 
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2 
of the evidence" so as to warrant reversal of the district 
court's decision. See Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 
F.2d 781, 785-86 (1986); see also Anderson v. Bessemer 
City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) ("If the district court's 
account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record 
viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not 
reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting 
as trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence 
differently."). For this reason, I am constrained to concur 
in affirming the district court's conclusion on liability. 
I also concur, but even more reluctantly, in affirming 
the award of a partnership interest under the circum-
stances here. While I agree with the majority that the 
plain language of section 706(g) of title VII, together with 
its legislative history and interpreting case law, make it 
clear that partnership is a permissible remedy under title 
VII, I am convinced that this extraordinary equitable rem-
edy should be dispensed only under limited circumstances 
when justice so dictates. Partnership is a relationship 
requiring trust and cooperation among the individual 
partners. As Justice Powell observed in Hishon, this rela-
tionship "differs markedly . from that between employer 
and employee," the former "contemplat[ing] that deci-
sions important to the partnership normally will be made 
by common agreement . . . or consent among the 
partners." 467 U.S. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring);2 see 
also Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 273 (10th 
Cir.) (partnerships "embody very special relationships and 
sensitive management concerns inter se"), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 986 (1987). Further, the partnership relationship 
imposes on each partner mutual liability for the miscon-
duct of each other partner. See J. Crane & A. Bromberg, 
Law of Partnership § 58 (1968). For these reasons, courts 
should exercise great caution in awarding the remedy of · 
partnership to avoid excessive intrusion on or disruption 
of the often delicate partnership relationship. In my view, 
Hopkins's conduct toward other employees and partners 
2Justice Powell was speaking of law partnerships in particular 
but his reasoning applies equally to an accounting partnership . 
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3 
both before3 and, particularly, after her candidacy 
deferment4 casts great doubt on her ability to function 
effectively with the other Price Waterhouse partners. 
Nevertheless, I cannot say that under these circumstances 
the district court abused its discretion in awarding Hop-
kins a partnership interest . 
As the district court noted, Price Waterhouse, which 
has over 900 partners in approximately 90 locations 
throughout the country, "lacks the intimacy and interde-
pendence of smaller partnerships." 737 F. Supp. at 1210. 
For that reason, it is far less likely than many smaller and 
more cohesive partnerships to suffer serious disruption if 
forced to accept a partner of Hopkins's disposition. Fur-
ther, assuming, as we must in light of the district court's 
factual findings, that Hopkins was the victim of gender 
discrimination, she is entitled to compensation of some 
sort and the available remedies are limited. While I am 
loath to reward Hopkins's conduct with an award of part-
3See supra note 1. 
4The district court made an express finding that during the year following deferment of her partnership candidacy Hopkins engaged in "unreasonable intentional conduct" by substantially misrepresenting to Donald Epelbaum, a partner in her section, a conversation she had with the chairman and senior partner, Joseph E. Connor. 737 F. Supp. at 1212-13. Relying on "strong" evidence in the record, the district court found that Hopkins "misstated" the substance of her conversation with Connor and "misleadingly implied that Mr. Connor had disparaged certain partners who opposed her candidacy and that he had warned of adverse consequences his partners might experience by opposing her candidacy." 737 F. Supp. at 1213. Because of that incident, Epelbaum withdrew his previously strong support of Hopkins's partnership candidacy. Nor was that the first time Hopkins acted with something less than full candor to partners in the firm. In 1980, she represented to another partner that a project had been completed "within budget" when, in fact, there was a $35,000 dis-crepancy which she acknowledged only after persistent question-ing. J.A. 40. In light of the facts in the record, I, unlike the majority, find no irony in Price Waterhouse's reluctance to accept as partner an individual whose history so strongly suggests she cannot be trusted. 
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4 
nership, the alternative remedy of unr
estricted front pay 
is even less satisfactory and, as 
the district court 
observed, with considerable restraint, 
"might well provide 
a wholly unwarranted windfall." 737 F
. Supp. at 1211. 
Based on the entire record, I am doubt
ful that the judg-
ment of the district court achieves ju
stice. Nevertheless, 
because my skepticism falls somewhat
 short of "a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has
 been committed,"
5 
I am required to concur in the majo
rity's affirmance of 
that judgment. 
5See United States v. United States Gyp
sum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 
395 (1948) (A finding of the trial court 
may be reversed as clearly 
erroneous "when although there is ev
idence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence i
s left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has bee
n committed."). 
